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Abstract 
This paper documents and seeks to explain the remarkably positive employment trends of a 
central area of London in the years since the onset of the financial crisis. The volatility of this 
economy since the 1980s had suggested the likelihood of a sharp loss of jobs, maybe 
followed by a strong bounce-back, if the finance sector could overcome reputational damage 
from its role in the debacle of 2007-8. In fact this area proved both the most resilient in the 
downturn and the most dynamic in the upturn, accounting for all/most net job gains in the UK. 
This paper considers three types of explanation for this positive outcome - in terms of: 
fundamental economic strengths allowing it to keep going through generally tough times; an 
advantaged position in relation to elite choices about resource allocation and restructuring in 
the face of a general fiscal/commercial squeeze; and (less conventionally) the impact of 
massive support to/through the banking sector, in first mitigating i mpacts of the downturn 
for the financial centre, and then fuelling another global city boom. The last of these is argued 
to be key to understanding not only why central London has done so well since the crisis, but 
how it is still liable to be ‘the capital of boom and bust’. 
Keywords: spatial imbalance, regional economic fluctuation, financial centre, monetary 
JEL Classifications: R11; R12; E58; E32 
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Three Motivating Snippets 
Hat check girl: "Goodness, what beautiful diamonds"; Blonde customer: "Goodness had 
nothing to do with it, dearie”.      Mae West, Night After Night, 1937 
'The problem with QE is: it works in practice, but it doesn’t work in theory‘. 
Ben Bernanke, final Q & A as Chair of the Fed, 2014 
‘A rising tide raises all (luxury) yachts’    Ajay Kapur, Citigroup Plutonomy Report 2, 2006. 
1. Introduction
Seven years into the current economic depression, consciousness of the extent to which 
London - which jointly fathered the financial crisis - escaped lightly from its consequences 
(even if many individual Londoners did not) still seems to be growing, though there is not yet 
an adequate explanation of how it happened.  Rhetorically, the terms of discussion polarise 
between: a view of the city rising to new challenges of change, competition and creativity, 
and triumphing over its rivals in strictly economic terms; and one which sees it as having 
been unreasonably favoured by those public and private sector decision-makers applying the 
prescribed austerity – again triumphing,  but in more political terms.    
Adopting a rather more detached analytic perspective, and focusing on the specific puzzle as 
to why London’s overall employment trends have been so favourable since 2007 (against the 
norm elsewhere), there currently seem to be three kinds of potential explanation in play.  One 
of these suggests that, irrespective of institutional responses to the banking crisis and fiscal 
deficit, the London economy is simply much better placed than its rivals to cope with their 
aftermath, given its long term sources of competitive advantage (‘when the going gets tough, 
the tough get going’ ?) .  A second takes a more contingent approach, accounting for the 
relatively favourable employment trends in London in relation to several independent factors 
which have conditioned the way in which post-2007 cut-backs (in jobs, infrastructure 
investment and/or public services) came to be applied in London (with the city ‘punching 
beyond its weight’ ?).  The last, claims a more straightforward link with the character of the 
financial crisis, and the massive scale of the support that the state has felt obliged to deploy 
since then, to the great benefit of the big beasts of UK financial services, and London as an 
international finance centre – rather than to other parts of the national economy (‘goodness 
had nothing to do with it’ ?).    
2 
The distinctive focus of this paper is on exploring the third of these. But it starts by 
examining the character and unexpectedness of employment growth in London since autumn 
2007 (section 2), and then discusses the limits to how much of this remarkable development 
the first two types of explanation could account for, alone or together (section 3).  Attention 
then turns entirely to the significance of the support accorded to the financial sector by the 
state (and indirectly the taxpayer/saver), making a case firstly in terms of the massive scale of 
that support, and its concentration on London-based operations (section 4), and then by 
seeking to establish credible ways in which bail-outs, implicit subsidy and quantitative easing 
can have been translated specifically into employment/spending power within London – and 
overseas – rather than elsewhere within the UK (section 5).   The conclusion addresses the 
question of how far current indicators of a vigorous boom in the central London economy 
(particularly) represent the start of another speculative cycle, after one whose bust phase was 
effectively masked, rather than more evidence of transition to a stable and sustainable growth 
path1. 
2. Differential Employment Impacts of the Financial Crisis 2007-13:
Central London versus the RUK
Over the half century before the financial crisis, employment trends in (Greater) London 
reflected three main factors: a continuing secular expansion in business services; limits on 
space availability for economic activity or worker housing; and a sharp decline in goods-
related jobs, where agglomeration economies offered the least (net) advantage.  
In the first half of this period, the scale of manufacturing/port transport job loss outweighed 
that of growth in office employment.  But by the early 1980s there were few jobs left to lose 
in London’s goods-related sectors and the balance switched, yielding some net increase in 
overall employment.  The switch-point coincided with several qualitative developments 
which reinforced these trends:  a resurgence of globalisation, involving extended market 
competition (in services as well as goods); increasing reliance in advanced economies on 
product qualities as the basis for competitive advantage; and multinationalisation of business 
1
 The UK economy was actually supposed to be on such a path between 2001 and 2007, with 
constant near-full employment, but consumption growth supported by an increasingly 
unsustainable level of personal debt.  
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and of financial markets via interlinked international financial centres (IFC). 
Around these broad long-term trends the city’s economy experienced fluctuations, which 
were very largely parallel to those across the rest of the UK.  In the first half of the period 
these cyclical swings were proportionately smaller than in any other region, whereas in the 
second half the position was reversed, and they appeared proportionately larger than 
anywhere else2.   
This shift was not simply because of London’s more rapid transition from an industrial to a 
post-industrial economy, but reflected a more general switch in the sectoral and spatial 
patterns of activity across the British economy.  In the earlier period cyclicality was bound up 
with the degree to which industries served investment/consumer durables markets, where 
demand was more responsive to the current state of liquidity and of the ‘animal spirits’, in the 
national economy.  The cyclical sensitivity of regional employment then essentially reflected 
their industrial mix (Gordon, 1985).  In the later period, sectoral volatility seems to have 
more to do with the propensity to innovate – being notably high in ITC and financial/business 
services3.  The most cyclically sensitive regions were again those which specialised in the 
more sensitive activities, but the variability now was much greater than purely compositional 
effects would account for (Gordon, forthcoming).  Volatility now appeared to be a systemic 
property of innovative regions – arguably reflecting an intimate relation between innovation, 
buzz and speculation, of all kinds, feeding through to regionally significant ‘animal spirits’ 
(Gordon, 2011).   
It was quite reasonable to expect then that, when (eventually, in autumn 2007) the 'sub-prime' 
crisis signalled another on-coming bust (20 years after Black Monday), London would be in 
for substantially more than its share of national job losses.  This did not prove to be the case, 
however: the city’s employment continued to grow, with only a modest hiccup, after the 
second, ‘Lehman Brothers’, shock (in autumn 2008). Taking average employment in 2007 as 
the benchmark - and using an LFS-based measure counting all ‘main jobs’, whether 
employed or self-employed, with part-time posts treated as half-jobs - there was actually a net 
2
 In the case of unemployment (as distinct from employment) trends the patterns are rather 
different, since recessions also impact on regional labour supply, via a blunting of mobility, 
thus leading to consistently larger unemployment swings in regions of long term employment 
decline.(Gordon,  1985),  
3
 If still less so than in construction, and apparently being matched by a disappearing 
mining/quarrying sector. 
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increase in London over the next 6 years of 277 thousand (8%) as compared with a net 
reduction of 329 thousand (2%) across the rest of the country.  Even more strikingly, virtually 
all of London’s net increase was concentrated in the City of London and 4 adjacent 
boroughs4, where full-time equivalent (FTE) numbers increased by 259 thousand (20%).  For 
these central areas (as Table 1 shows) this actually represented a substantial acceleration of 
growth as compared with the 3 previous years (from 1.9% to 3.4% p.a.), whereas elsewhere 
in London, as outside, there was a downturn (from gains of 0.8% p.a. across all other areas, to 
net losses of 0.1% p.a.).  This positive differential was evident every year, except for the 
boroughs’ single year of net job losses (in 2008/9) at a rate close to the national average.  But 
even then, its level of employment dropped only just below that of 2007, before powering 
ahead, and getting in 3 years of really strong growth before employment in the rest of the 
country started to recover, in 2013 - if still with growth rates well below those in central 
London (Figure 1a). This experience contrasts very strongly with that in the last recession, 
when it took a full decade for the central boroughs to recover their (1988) peak level of 
employment – as well as with the norm for European capitals during this one (Dijkstra et al.’ 
2015). 
Using ABI/BRES (employer-based) estimates to look more closely at the spatial pattern of 
change5, a coherent zone of strong employment growth is found across an area extending 
some way beyond the historic (rail-terminus-based) boundaries of Central London, with an 
eastern outpost around Canary Wharf on the Isle of Dogs6. On an FTE basis, employee jobs 
alone grew by 208 thousand (14%) within this Central London Zone (CLZ) between 2007 
and 2013, against a net decrease of 484 thousand (-2 %) in the rest of the UK.  
Despite this remarkable degree of spatial clustering in employment growth, it does not appear 
to be bound up with a single functional cluster of particular economic dynamism. Whether 
this might be the case is not very easy to test, because - though casual empiricism suggests all 
sorts of interdependence among the activities of London’s central business district, and 
4
 Camden, Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Westminster.  
5
 At the aggregate level, for which they are less suited, these data show a more jagged version 
of the same basic pattern of change through these years (Table 1 lower part and Figure 1b).   
6
 This area, defined on a ward basis, includes the whole of the City plus about half of 
Camden, Hackney, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Westminster, with a small part of 
Southwark (and Lambeth).  It includes 54 wards in all, stretching from Knightsbridge in the 
west to Dalston in the north, the Elephant and Castle in the south and Mile End in the east 
(with Canary Wharf/Isle of Dogs as an appendage); - see map in Figure 2. 
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interested parties encourage the idea that everything ultimately depends on financial services 
(or even its global sector) – there has been no substantial research effort to quantify the 
strength and structure of these linkages.  However, the fact that at a detailed sectoral level 
CLZ trends look very uneven, with most broad (service) sectors including some high growth 
activities, not obviously linked to those in others, suggests that several distinguishable groups 
have all done very well within the CLZ, for one reason or more. 
A rough but plausible grouping of these activities involves half a dozen rather different foci, 
each co9ntributing significantly to overall job7: 
1. Finance (including IT within the financial districts) adding some 20 thousand
jobs;
2. Business administration (head offices, and management consultancy) up by some
50 thousand jobs;
3. Property Development/Services (construction, architecture and real estate) up by
around 35-50 thousand8;
4. Creative Commerce (publishing, broadcasting, film/video and advertising, plus
some IT in the creative districts) up by some 30 thousand;
5. Public Services (administration, health, education and social care) up by some 50
thousand;
6. Tourism (hotels and restaurants) up about 20 thousand.
Though wide-ranging, this listing of expanding groups excludes many core central London 
activities (e.g. law, accounting, theatres, and retailing).  Information/digital technology 
activities, which did show substantial employment growth, are not separated out since they 
seem to play distinct (support) roles in several clusters (including finance, creative commerce 
7
 The numbers are rough, both because of judgements about where cluster boundaries should 
be drawn (e.g. in relation to sub-sectors with recorded declines) and issues about the 
reliability and consistency of the data series (here depending primarily on ABI/BRES).  
8
 The range cited here relates to the significance of self-employment and agency employment 
in the construction industry; self-employment from the LFS has been added here to 
ABI/BRES employment figures, but LFS estimates also imply substantially larger growth in 
the sector’s employment, which the ABI/BRES may have attributed to the ‘employment 
agency’ sector.     
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and business administration), to which their job increases were imputed on the basis of the 
localities in which they occurred.  For each of the six clusters which are distinguished, 
employment trends in the CLZ were much more positive than in the rest of the country.  But 
the relative scale of change recorded for them also clearly reflects some national realities; for 
instance the fact that construction, banking, and publishing experienced job losses across the 
whole country, while head offices/consultancy showed strong general growth.   
Faster relative growth in the CLZ within each of these clusters made an important 
contribution to a large (and accelerated) job growth there during post-crisis years, that is not 
reducible either to the growth of a single cluster or a generalised upturn in competitiveness of 
the city's service economy.  
3. Conventional Explanations of London’s Positive Employment Trends
3.1 London’s Structural Advantages 
One strand of commentary on (Central) London’s success in sustaining and then expanding 
employment levels during the post-crisis period simply draws attention to all those sources of 
structural advantage (or absence of key disadvantages) which have generally favoured its 
economic progress, over that of other UK regions, during the past 30 years or so.  A short list 
of these includes: sheer scale; a particularly strong base in  the advanced business services 
which have prospered everywhere during this era; the absence (or earlier demise) of the 
production sectors which have been in long term decline across the UK; a strong capacity to 
attract, retain and develop a highly qualified workforce; a very flexible labour market; a large 
and sophisticated customer base for high value products; and particularly strong international 
linkages and information networks (Buck et al., 2002).  
To apply these as explanations for trends since 2007 - and why these differ from previous 
crisis/recovery sequences with less favourable employment outcomes – requires some reason 
for expecting either that some of these advantages have become substantially stronger since 
those earlier episodes, or that the particular way in which the wider economy has 
subsequently evolved would now make some of them much more salient.   
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One obvious structural advantage has been in the industrial mix of (Central) London jobs, 
with a very few in the manufacturing sector, where employment elsewhere fell by some 20% 
(600 thousand jobs), and substantially more in business services where it actually grew by 
half that amount. This compositional difference alone could account for 6 out of the 22 
percentage points difference in proportionate employment change between the 5 central 
boroughs and the rest of the UK.  The significance of this factor is not peculiar to this post-
crisis period, however, being central to longer term trends in the area since conventional 
manufacturing disappeared from central London.  To see what it might explain in relation to 
this particular downturn, we need firstly to express (annual) rates of employment change for 
each sector in terms of deviations from the longer term (peak-peak) rates of change – and 
then compare the latest downturn with its predecessor in the early 1990s9. On this basis, 
sectoral variations in the impact of the downturns look more modest.  For the 1990s case, the 
sharpest decreases nationally were experienced in production industries.   After the 2007 
crisis, however, it was construction which had the severest job losses, followed by a wide 
range of commercial services (including in which those central London specialises in), 
though with professional/technical services showing little impact, and public services actually 
expanding their employment10. In neither case then does it seem that London’s particular 
responsiveness (in the 1990s) or unresponsiveness (post-2007) can be attributed to its pattern 
of sectoral specialisation.  
In occupational terms also it might be thought that (Central) London would have been 
substantially favoured by its bias toward jobs demanding higher levels of qualification,  - 
given that employers are (rationally) expected to respond to temporary downturns in demand 
by hanging on to those workers who would be most expensive to replace and reintegrate 
when the upturn comes, while releasing redundant workers in less skilled jobs.  This rule of 
thumb may not fit the post-2007 situation, however, for a couple of reasons. The first is that, 
once the scale of the financial shock became evident (after a year or so of ‘phoney crisis’ for 
most sectors) few can have expected a rapid recovery in demand.  The other is that the 
principle has less force in a thick labour market such as London’s where there are many 
9
 The focus here is on the downturn phase, since it is here that (central) London’s favourable 
performance is most unexpected.  Long term trends are represented here by 1990 Q1-2008 
Q3 rates of change, and the two downturns by 1990 Q1 – 1993 Q1 and 2008 Q3 –2010 Q3.  
10
 Early job losses in manufacturing seem to have been checked by the substantial 2008/9 
depreciation in the exchange rate, after which overall UK manufacturing employment 
actually stabilised, with a break from its long term downward trend. 
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employers of any particular skill type, and workers are less likely to drift away during a 
downturn (Buck/Gordon, 2000).  As it turned out, while different skill groups were unevenly 
affected by employers’ responses to falling demand, in this occasion it did not simply favour 
those in jobs with more qualified workers, or those traditionally concentrated in central 
London.   Thus, while across the country as a whole it was professional jobs (the most over-
represented group in the CLZ) which grew fastest between 2007 and 2013, they were nearly 
matched by caring, leisure and service occupations  (of which the CLZ has relatively less); at 
the other extreme, the two groups showing the fastest contractions were process/machine 
operatives and secretarial/administrative workers – one being much under-represented in 
central London, while it has an above average proportion of the latter.  It is a very mixed 
picture, which arithmetically suggests just a slight occupational bias in central London’s 
favour (of about 2%) over this period – maybe no more than in pre-crisis years. 
A more original hypothesis has linked London’s performance after this crisis to the 
emergence of more entrepreneurial combinations of the (artistically) creative, and IT talent 
that the city attracts. The most publicised versions associate this with an emergent ‘Tech 
City’, in regenerated areas of inner east London, with some recent government support. These 
accounts tend, however, to conflate: a qualitative image, based on (artistically) creative 
businesses in the Shoreditch and Clerkenwell areas (just north of the City), that  emerged 
during the dot-com bubble;  a much larger-scale (post-2007) growth of IT in core financial 
districts (of the City itself and Canary Wharf); and potential development space further east 
around the Olympic Park (Whitehead et al., 2012; McWilliams, 2015).  In fact, though the 
recovery has seen a substantial growth of jobs in creative commerce (specifically advertising 
and video production), this has been largely in established West End and Holborn 
concentrations, rather than the inner east.  In relation to the more novel developments of 
creative tech, and the contribution to these of official ‘Tech City’ initiatives, whatever their 
longer term prospects, the available research (Nathan and Vandore, 2014) suggests that they 
cannot yet be credited with a substantial role in the CLZ’s post-2007 employment boom.    
A much clearer boost has come from (central) London’s established strength as a destination 
for international tourists, with approaching half of their UK expenditure (D/OE, 2012), and 
growth that actually accelerated after the crisis. Demand in this sector is income elastic (and 
thus sensitive to recession elsewhere) but also price elastic11 and thus one of the significant 
11
 BTA (2001) estimates for the sector are 3 times those for overall exports, whereas those for 
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winners from the large sterling depreciation  (of around 25%) occurring alongside the share 
price collapse between mid-2007 and early 2009.  The outcome across London as a whole 
was that spending by these visitors fell back by under 3% in the first 2 years of the crisis, and 
then resumed the rapid growth path of the boom years (averaging 9% p.a. since 2009). Rough 
arithmetic on elasticity estimates and employment figures for the sector suggests that sterling 
depreciation may well have contributed 20 thousand FTEs to job growth in the CLZ.  
Another of London’s established strengths which might have contributed to growth over the 
period stems from a specialisation in highly differentiated elite consumption opportunities 
with a ‘global city’ cachet.  A historic competitive advantage in serving this market has been 
reinforced over the past 30 years as increased income inequalities within the UK have 
boosted the spending power of the top tail of the city’s (increasingly) skewed occupational 
structure (Buck et al., 2002).  This trend may have been reinforced in one or two important 
ways since the financial crises.   
One is an apparent upsurge in the fraction of a newly wealthy ‘global’ elite with offshore 
incomes who choose to base themselves for at least part of their time in London.  There is a 
long run dynamic to their growth, from enjoyment of the social/consumption externalities of 
living among their peers12. Stories abound about a distinct influx since 2007 of rich migrants 
seeking a more secure home for their assets. But hard facts about numbers and economic 
impacts (beyond those on property prices in the most desirable locations) are elusive.  
The other, combines the propositions of Kapur et al (2005, 2006a/b) about high consumption 
propensities among a growing superclass of (high-earning and asset-rich plutocrats, with a 
common perception that they alone may have prospered from the crisis and its aftermath. 
Well documented reports of CEOs’ soaring salaries/reward packages during this period lend 
credibility to the hypothesis.  But, over the span of the whole 6 year (crisis, recession and 
recovery) period considered in this paper, the evidence is that neither earnings nor wealth 
levels have grown especially fast among  those in the plutocratic class (say the top 1% or 
0.1%).  Reversing the pattern of pre-crisis trends, evidence from tax returns actually suggests 
no overall income growth at all the 99th percentile in the UK (up to 2012/3), while increasing 
other services tend to be below average (Kamath and Paul, 2011).    
12
 Speakers at a Plutonomy Symposium in 2006 noted 3 relevant (social) desires among those 
buying luxury goods - to show off, to explore, and to acquire an expertise to be asked about – 
and that the ultra-rich tend to be very global, not part of a specific geography, but ‘hanging 
out in plutonomy destinations (like London) with fellow plutonomists’ (Kapur et al., 2006b).  
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significantly at lower levels (HMRC, 2015). Among the top 0.1% too, runaway growth, in 
current incomes, before the crisis was reversed after 2009 (Alvaredo et al., 2015). In relation 
to wealth, while the share of the top 1% does seem to have increased by a further couple of 
percentage points since the crisis, total personal wealth in the UK, which is estimated to have 
grown by about 50% in the years before, quickly fell back again; though recovering from 
2011 on, it only regained its 2007 level in 2013 (CSR, 2014). For the 2007-13 period as a 
whole then, the implication is that wealth levels of the super-rich had growth quite modestly 
(by about 10%), though rising strongly during the recovery phase.  Given the particular 
importance of financial (rather than property) assets to the plutocracy, the FTSE index 
provides another (simpler) indicator of likely trends in their wealth: in real (price adjusted) 
terms, this fell by about 40% in 2008/9, undoing the gains of the previous 4 years, but then 
quickly turned up again, recovering about half the lost ground by 2013.  Similar trends in the 
purchasing power of the globally mobile elite are reflected in an index of London prices for 
prime international residential properties which, having fallen by about 25% in 2008/9, then 
turned around and advanced steadily to a point some 50% higher by 2013 (KF, 2014). In 
summary, then, it seems that the plutonomy factor can scarcely explain London’s 
unexpectedly strong performance over the period as a whole; but that it might have 
contributed substantially to the strength of the economic upturn in the second half of the 
period.  
3.2 Spatially Significant Policies (public and private) 
Another line of explanation involves the idea that the central London economy may have 
been particularly favoured during the post-crisis period by central government  initiatives or 
strategic shifts on the part of corporate decision-makers with London-centric views. 
Potentially significant examples among these include both major infrastructure projects of the 
Olympic Games and Crossrail, and apparently quite uneven effects in the application of 
rationalisation/austerity programmes in the private and public sectors, as between (central) 
London and other parts of the country.   
The London Olympic bid (in 2004) and award (in 2005) both date from the heyday of the 
long boom, and even the quadrupling of its budget (to £9.2bn, in March 2007) pre-dated 
recognition of any emergent crisis.   Crossrail as a project had a very much longer history 
11 
(including a government supported bill in 1991) and had been approved in principle on 
several occasions (though without assured funding), before the 2010 spending review finally 
spelled out how the £15 bn. costs would be met, including a £5bn. contribution from central 
government.  Investment in both projects is spread over a number of years: including 5 years 
of concentrated activity in the case of the Olympics and some 9 years for Crossrail.   Most of 
the public sector activity for both13 is included within the capital account of the Treasury’s 
Public Spending Statistics under the Economic Affairs heading14. For London as a whole, this 
shows a growth from £2.4 bn. in 2007-8 to a peak of £4.2 bn. in 2009-10, before settling back 
to £3 bn. in 2012-13 – while the total in other regions fell from £23 bn. to £12 bn. and then 
£10 bn.  Given the timing of the Olympics, and the fact that the main site lay mostly outside 
the central boroughs (and wholly outside the CLZ) it is just Crossrail that is likely to be of 
significance in relation to central London employment growth between 2007 and 2013. Its 
construction workforce has been around 10 thousand, with the great majority probably 
employed within the central boroughs, where both tunnelling and new stations are 
concentrated, contributing maybe a quarter of the 35 thousand growth in construction jobs 
recorded there between 2010 and 201315.  
In addition to these impacts of discrete investment projects, there are ‘policy’ issues also 
about the spatial structuring of retrenchment in both public and private sector activities in the 
face of revenue and fiscal shocks. These questions arise particularly, since both private 
headquarters and public services appear as activity clusters with expanding employment 
recorded in central London. 
Within the public service sector16, some of the recorded employment increases (e.g. in 
primary schools or social care services), funded on a more-or-less formulaic basis are likely 
to reflect particular sources of local demand growth, as with the growing school age 
population in areas of recent immigration.  Others (including universities and hospitals) 
where there is more active competition for students, programmes and advanced facilities, 
may reflect the changing terms on which this is carried out (e.g. with full-cost fees applied to 
all students) offering a greater potential for big city institutions with strong 
national/international reputations to prosper. 
13
 The main exception being the (social) housing element of Olympics construction.   
14
  HM Treasury Public Spending Statistics, releases Oct. 2012 and October 2013  
15
 On LFS estimates. 
16
 Parts of which will actually be purely private or private contractors to public institutions 
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But there is also a generic issue, straddling the public and private sectors about how head 
offices and other strategic functions have fared in the face of general rationalisation 
pressures.  A common theme here seems to have been a strengthening of these core 
operations, while cost saving has been pursued elsewhere. In the private sector, head offices 
were newly recognised as an ‘industry’, in the 2007 version of the SIC, which had previously 
just distinguished the HQs of multi-sectoral conglomerates. Since a first appearance in the 
2008 ABI/BRES, the head office category has continuously expanded, adding some 120 
thousand jobs nationally (+92%) over the next 5 years, including 25 thousand in the CLZ 
(+155%)17.  A parallel process seems to have operated within the mainstream bank/building 
society sector, whereby boards have sought to make good the losses (and legal penalties) 
incurred in their ‘wholesale’ investment banking operations by cost-cutting initiatives 
focused on retail banking and its back-office supports out in the regions. Between 2008 and 
2013, while (on ABI/BRES figures) the sector’s employment in the central boroughs grew by 
some 14 thousand (14%), across the rest of the country it fell by 40 thousand (11%).  Within 
the civil service too, job reductions over this period were much more modest in central 
London, because the one significant group to have increased their numbers (by 10%) were 
the policy-grade officials (1-7) in Whitehall, directly supporting ministers.  Across the sectors 
then, the chosen forms of structural adjustment since the crisis - reinforcing strategic 
functions while rationalising jobs in routine production, support and client-facing activities - 
have indirectly afforded a significant boost to Central London’s share of national 
employment.  
4. Support for the UK Finance Sector since the Financial Crisis
Since the onset of the crisis, with the recognition in autumn 2007 of sub-prime lending (in the 
US and on a more limited scale in the UK), UK financial services and their major 
stakeholders have benefited from three distinguishable types of support from (or through) the 
state: 
17
 It is, of course, possible that some of this growth is not genuine, but a statistical illusion, 
reflecting operational delays in recognising head office establishments.  But inspection of the 
location and timing of various recorded additions does not suggest a simple reclassification 
out of some other activity.   
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1 bail-outs, designed to safeguard key elements of the banking system (nationally, but 
also internationally), through a combination of direct investment in vulnerable banks 
and state initiated restructuring; 
2 implicit subsidies to banking operations during potentially risky times, as an 
unintended consequence of the market’s understanding that similar safeguards were to 
expected in any future situations where large/strategically significant banks were at 
risk; and 
3 monetary expansion, via Bank rate reductions and injections of additional liquidity – 
including rounds of quantitative easing (QE) and a Funding for Lending scheme – to 
revive both demand and supply of investment finance, in support of a desired 
recovery and rebalancing of the UK economy.  
4.1 Bailouts 
Financial bail-out operations in the UK started with efforts in 2007/8 to stem a run on the 
Northern Rock mortgage bank, and then to deal with the impact on other banks’ balance 
sheets of mortgage-backed securities and other assets that had become illiquid following the 
sub-prime crisis. For Northern Rock this involved first a special loan facility from the Bank 
of England, and then nationalisation, with a subsequent sell-off of the more viable banking 
operations.  For the much wider set of banks facing consequential balance sheet problems, a 
Special Liquidity Scheme was introduced.  This was intended simply to resolve these, not to 
finance any new lending.  But it effectively provided subsidised capital to a large number of 
banks with such problematic assets. At the Scheme’s peak in early 2009, £185bn of Treasury 
bills had been lent by the Bank for a period of up to three years (John et al., 2012).   
A much broader UK bank rescue package followed in the (autumn 2008) second stage of the 
crisis, as the failure of Lehman Bros. in New York set off an international wave of concern 
about bank stability.  This package included both a state guarantee for inter-bank lending and 
provision for the government to buy bank shares, subject to some policy conditions (on 
executive pay, dividends and lending policy).  This provision was extended over the 
following year to cover rescue of two of the UK’s largest banks (Lloyds and RBS) and 
another building society (the Bradford and Bingley).  The total value of guarantees then rose 
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to a peak of over  £1trillion, with an actual cash commitment of around £120 bn.18. 
Expressed aims included encouragement of lending to creditworthy borrowers, but the 
dominant concerns were clearly protecting depositors and maintaining financial stability, by 
assuring the liquidity and capital of the banks.  
4.2 Implicit Subsidies 
The second line of support to the (big) banks was unintended, but followed from the bail-out 
experience, taking the form of implicit subsidies, as a perceived government guarantee of 
their viability allowed the banks to borrow at lower interest rates. Even before the 2007/8 
financial crisis, there had been some such subsidy (as now at the expense of savers, rather 
than tax-payers). But their value grew sharply during these crises, as the objective riskiness of 
the banks’ position was understood, and then (decisively) as bailouts made clear the political 
reality that these banks were ‘too big’ (or strategically significant) to be allowed ‘to fail’. 
Increased margins of implicit subsidy still persist internationally despite various states 
signalling an intended shift toward ‘bail ins’ (by creditors) in any similar situations (Elliott, 
2014). 
In the UK, recognition of the importance of these subsidies dates from Haldane’s (2010) 
analyses, showing how gaps in rating agencies’ evaluation of major banks’ creditworthiness, 
according to assumptions about state support, translated into differences in the borrowing 
costs they incurred.   For the ‘big 5’ UK banks these were estimated at £59bn. in 2008, and 
£107 bn. in 2009:  with a comparable methodology, IMF (2014) shows the rate of subsidy 
falling off in each subsequent year, though still well above pre-crisis levels in 2013; with an 
alternative methodology, they have the interest rate subsidy to ‘systematically important 
banks’ rising again in 2012/3 to well above its 2009 peak. 
Unintended (and undesirable) effects of these subsidies included both incentivising excessive 
risk-taking (moral hazard), and encouraging individual banks to expand well beyond the 
point of maximum (social) productivity.  Perversely, both risks of failure and the 
unacceptability of such events were thus enhanced.  And, ironically, restructuring of those 
UK banks that actually needed bailing out during the crisis served to further increase 
18
 According to annual reports to Parliament from the Comptroller and Auditor General on 
Maintaining Financial Stability across the UK’s Banking System.  
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concentration (Haldane, 2012). 
4.3 Monetary expansion 
By contrast with these forms of support to the (UK) banking system itself, monetary 
interventions - to reduce the general cost of borrowing, increase liquidity and/or expand the 
money supply - were directed more at boosting levels of activity in the productive economy. 
Whether, how, and where this is effectively achieved are not clear-cut, however, either in 
theory or in terms of empirical econometrics. This is the force of Bernanke’s parting quote 
about the major intervention of this kind working ‘in practice, but not in theory’. 
Three forms of monetary intervention of this kind have been pursued sequentially in the UK 
since the 2007/8 crises.  Initially it involved conventional form of bank rate cuts, intended to 
revive investment and bring forward discretionary spending by reducing the cost of credit 
(and encourage optimism). The scale of the shock to expectations from the crisis events, plus 
a ‘credit crunch’ as lenders sought to tighten up on what now appeared much riskier loans, 
meant that a rapid series of such bank rate reductions had to be made – with the rate falling to 
an effective ’floor’ of 0.5% in March 2009.   
To provide further monetary stimulus to a very weak economy, the Bank then followed the 
example of its US counterpart, introducing the more experimental (‘unconventional’) 
programme of asset purchases characterised as quantitative easing (QE).  In essence this 
involved the Bank printing (electronic) money to finance purchase of gilts and other high 
quality financial assets from private businesses.   Quite how this monetary intervention would 
connect with developments in the real economy was always going to be both complex and 
uncertain, with theoretical expectations depending on how imperfect the capital market was 
in practice (Weale and Wieladek, 2014).  One of the central ideas was that injecting  liquidity 
in this way, lowering of the yield on less risky asset types, should encourage a flow of funds 
into the corporate sector, and (crucially) into productive investment (‘portfolio rebalancing’) 
– preferably within the UK, though that aspect was not spelled out.  The other idea was that
potential borrowers with a prospect of redeeming a debt, but concern over its cost, should 
understand the Bank as ‘signalling’ an intent to keep the interest rate low beyond the short 
term.  Some (more uncertain) investors might, of course, also get the message that the Bank 
did not foresee a strong upturn in demand across the UK economy in the near future.   The 
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initial budget for asset purchases was set at £165 bn., with subsequent rounds in 2011-12 
bringing the total to £375 bn..  Though the magnitudes are comparable to those estimated for 
implicit subsidies, it should be emphasised that they are not comparable as forms of support 
to the financial sector, which benefits from QE only to degree that it can use this to achieve 
increased returns (or, equivalently, to sustain returns while meeting tighter liquidity targets).  
Though the Bank referred to QE as ‘injecting money directly into the economy’ (BOE, 2009), 
it was not at all closely targeted, and the Bank’s statements were not explicit as to whether 
‘the economy’ in question was purely national.  To encourage a more direct flow of funds 
from banks into the (UK) real economy and get investment moving, a Funding for Lending 
Scheme was then introduced (jointly with the Treasury) in mid-2012 - modified in the 2 
subsequent years and now running into 2016, with incentives related to their lending 
performance (rewarding SME funding of all kinds, and then just business lending in later 
versions). The total drawdown on this scheme in early 2015 had reached £57bn., but net 
lending by the banks was negative through 2014. 
5. The Spatial Ramifications of Financial Support Policies
Since the 2007-8 financial crises the explicit aims of UK economic policies have involved 
firstly dealing with the threat/actuality of a recession in the national economy, and secondly 
initiating some longer-term rebalancing of the economy, in structural terms, but also 
regionally (reducing dependence on the extended London region).  Under the Labour 
government, sustaining public sector demand was used as a means of supporting activity 
levels, but since 2010 that has depended essentially on monetary policies, which have 
continued to be essentially macroeconomic in their aims and analytic basis.  The Bank’s own 
operational goal is set in terms of securing a level of demand in that economy consistent with 
a medium term inflation rate of around 2%.  And (with the recent exception of FLS financial 
support policies have been aimed essentially at: securing the bank deposits, and core set of 
financial institutions on which the mass of British businesses and citizens depend; and 
enabling/encouraging financial institutions to resume investing in longer-term/risky business 
opportunities.  
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These priorities (and policy tools) left little scope for thinking about the regional dimension 
of responses and impacts within the UK – though that might be relevant to consideration of 
complementary policies. More surprisingly, however, potential international implications also 
seem to have been considered in only a restricted way - in relation to exchange rate impacts, 
and encouraging complementary action by other major nations. That too is understandable for 
conventional interest rate-based policies, which operate essentially within/across the 
(national) currency area.  But it seems much less so for the unconventional policy of QE with 
its less transparent ramifications, in the context of a globalised set of financial markets (of 
which London is a key hub).     
From an economic geographer’s perspective there are a set of obvious questions to be asked – 
crudely about ‘where the money goes’, in terms of impacts on income streams, activity 
levels, and employment in different locations. Starting to address these (except in the case of 
identifiable bailouts) is very difficult, however, because the monetary/ financial analyses are 
not framed in terms that relate at all closely to components of GDP, still less to the sectors 
and locations where marginal investment projects (or increments to demand) might take 
occur. Even addressing the broadest questions about how QE, for example, has affected 
aggregate GDP and the inflation rate has required econometricians to make use of high 
frequency (financial data), and sophisticated monetary  models - neither with counterparts at 
sub-national scales - and omission of the kind of interaction effects that would be crucial to 
spatial analyses.  
There is no realistic prospect (in the near future at least) of moving on to more spatially 
/sectorally disaggregated questions about, for example, how the central London economy has 
been impacted – and with what implications for the rest of the UK.  But the scale of the 
monetary interventions pursued during this period is so vast that even identification of any 
credibly significant source of uneven impacts would be worthwhile. As a starting point here, 
some simple arguments and observations are offered in relation to bailouts, implicit subsides 
and QE, relevant to how (central) London might have been differentially affected.   
In the case of bailouts, the very obvious geographic point is that 3 of the 4 banks requiring 
direct state support were actually headquartered in peripheral regions (in Yorkshire, the North 
East and in Edinburgh), where the largest numbers of jobs, and probably accounts too, would 
have been at risk – though the feared knock-on effects would have accrued throughout the 
country and presumably impacted on London as the national banking centre.     
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For the implicit subsidies accruing to the big banks, the situation is a bit different, in that 
while we have reasonable estimates of their net value to different sorts of bank (e.g. in IMF, 
2014), we don’t know what they do with the money.  Basically it represents a 
simple/unwonted bonus to their profit and loss account (and ‘value added’), in relation to 
wholesale/investment banking activities. And ultimately it is expected to accrue to senior 
employees and shareholders, but its value beyond that of a simple transfer depends on what 
profit-earning investment opportunities the banks apply it to (Sowerbutts and Zimmerman, 
2015). And what consequences there are for employment levels in the sector (and/or its 
supply chain in IT etc.) depends on how they pursue these.  But, bearing in mind that about 
half of value-added in this sector is absorbed by the salary bill, the potential scale of 
employment effects within the central boroughs, where investment banking is concentrated, 
is indicated by the fact that the average of the banks’ implicit subsidy in the two peak years 
was in excess of the total salary bill for these five boroughs (of some £67bn on ASHE data 
for 2009).  
The case of quantitative easing is a lot more complex. In so far as it actually goes (ultimately) 
to fund additional investment projects within the UK, we might suppose that the corporate 
and spatial distribution of the extra activity/employment primarily reflected commercial 
judgements about the expected risk-return relation of these projects. These might be located 
anywhere, presumably more often in established  growth areas than in problem regions – but 
not to be heavily concentrated in central London. But a couple of other scenarios could 
involve impacts accruing more heavily to this metropolitan core. One is if it turns out that a 
large proportion of the funded investment projects are actually offshore, yielding impacts 
within the UK that are limited to the transaction costs of securing the investment opportunity. 
The other is if, a large part of the actual impact on activity levels came, not from such 
additional projects, but from the induced effects on asset values serving to revive the boom in 
plutocratic spending that was cut off by the stock market slump of 2007/8 (‘raising all luxury 
yachts’).  
The first of these hinges around the issue of the potential scale of leakages from QE within 
the UK to investment overseas, notably in emerging markets. This possibility seems to have 
been ignored in the early (spatially blind) discussion of QE in both the US and the UK, and 
then overshadowed by econometric evidence showing that GE had significantly boosted the 
level of domestic GDP (by perhaps 2% in the UK, see e.g. BoE, 2012). Arguably that (real) 
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gain is on the modest side, given the degree to which the economy had fallen beneath its 
growth path.  But, so far there seems to be no available benchmark as to what might 
reasonably be expected from this unconventional policy instrument if it were operating in a 
leak-proof setting.  Anyhow, questions started to be raised about the diversion of effects 
overseas in 2010, by a Texan Federal Bank Governor (in the US)  - citing firms as saying that 
more attractive opportunities to deploy cheap money were to be found overseas19 - and by 
two outsiders presenting  evidence to the (UK) Treasury Select Committee  in 201220. The 
argument was only seriously taken up, however, in mid-2013 , when analysts and policy-
makers with stakes in emerging these markets started to express alarm about the impact on 
inward investment of a prospective tapering in the American QE programme.  
For the UK case, one simple indicator of the scale of investment into these economies since 
around the time when QE was launched is the large increase in UK balance sheet assets there. 
Across 36 such emerging economies outside the Eurozone these increased from £527 bn. to 
£821bn. between 2009 and 2012, with their share of all UK-owned international assets rising 
from 5.9% to 8.0% (compared with a stable figure of around 6.6% in the 5 years before the 
crisis.  Such comparisons have now been followed up more carefully by a series of 
econometric studies looked more closely at the causal  links between US and/or UK policy 
and levels of flows to (or activity in), emerging markets.  Most obtain results implying a 
substantial overspill from QE into these markets (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Tillmann, 2014; and 
Rafiq, 2015) - though Ahmed and Slate (2013) find it significant only for portfolio 
investment, while Weale. and Wieladek (2014) detect no direct impact on emerging markets’ 
production, and Fratscher et al., 2013 report the first two phases of QE in the US as having 
inconsistent effects on the balance of flows.  Nevertheless, the Bank of England’s (2015) new 
research agenda accepts  that  ‘ there is now evidence that international spillovers of 
unconventional monetary policies may have been sizable, including to emerging market 
economies’ (BoE, 2015, 8).  If that is the case, then the UK’s principal banking centre is 
likely to have gained more in employment terms from the QE programme than the average 
region. 
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 Fisher (2010), picked up with more specific examples by a Bloomberg journalist (David 
Lynch: ‘Bernanke's “Cheap Money” stimulus spurs corporate investment outside U.S.’, Nov 
17, 2010).  
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 Professor Phillip Haynes and Alan W. Kay.  Kay argued that the Bank and Treasury had no 
idea where the benefit of the QE money went (just saying  that actual money could not leave 
the sterling area), and noted that Dr. Ros Altman had noted this issue in an article when QE 
was first announced.   
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 In relation to the second scenario, there is a clearer consensus about one of its key premises, 
namely that QE will have particularly boosted the financial position of the richest groups.  As 
expected, official purchase of gilts led to a substantial upturn in the value of a wide range of 
financial assets, disproportionately held by more wealthy households – which was expected 
(in turn) to stimulate higher consumption from asset-rich households. Overall the Bank 
(2012) estimated that QE was likely to have added some £600 billion to total household 
wealth, with disproportionate gains to the 5% who owned 40% of these assets – though that 
figure understates the likely concentration of gains, since it includes widespread holdings in 
the form of bank deposits whose value has not gone up.  For the US, where capital gains data 
are available, Saez (2015) presents a much stronger picture of the concentration of gains from 
the steep revival in share prices, claiming that almost 60% of the total increase in personal 
incomes in the US (including such gains) during the 2009-14 upswing accrued to the top 1%. 
The intersection of these trends with the consumption side of the plutonomy thesis is picked 
up by Kapur et al (2014) who graphically show the strong relations between the US Fed’s 
total assets (as an indicator of QE) and not just steeply rising NASDAQ/biotech stock prices, 
but also those of a basket of luxury suppliers (growing 6-fold over this period as an indication 
of strongly revived elite consumption) - and with growth in London property prices21. What 
remains is to show that a (QE-fuelled) upsurge in spending by the super-rich during the 
recovery phase has fed into a particular boost to central London activity, though that is a 
highly credible proposition. 
6. Conclusion
A central theme of this paper has been the idea that the modern (post-1980s) London 
economy is a fundamentally speculative one – in productive, unproductive and cognitive 
terms – with the implication that it is subject to wider cyclical swings.  That might well be 
true of all dynamic agglomerations, which would help explain why it was the norm for 
European metro capitals to experience larger employment falls than other regions following 
the 2007/8 financial crises (Dijkstra et al., 2015).  In the London case, at least, this tendency 
toward volatility had suggested that the downturn would be steeper than elsewhere in the UK, 
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 As also on Macau gambling and Malaysian property prices, for this is a global story about 
QE effects spilling beyond their country of origin.  
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though when recovery came it should also be stronger in London – so long as the credibility 
of central London’s core business sectors had not suffered too much from their involvement 
in those crises. In fact, however, the evidence of employment trends shows that central 
London (specifically) was no worse affected by the downturn than other parts of the country 
(probably less) – though its recovery has certainly been earlier and stronger. In these terms 
then, over the whole period from 2007 to 2013, this core area has not only out-performed the 
rest of the country, but also its own pre-crisis trends.  
One positive interpretation of this outcome is that it simply reflects an increased competitive 
advantage for the central London economy.  The grounds for believing this to have so 
improved since the (somewhat similar) recession of the early 1990s are not clear, however, 
though the impact of an (effective) devaluation on an already strong tourist demand would 
have contributed to this.  
If ‘goodness’ is not the whole (or the major) part of the story, then attention turns to ways in 
which significant developments in either public policy or that of the corporate sector could 
have made an important difference. In relation to fiscal policies, though the Olympics came 
and went during this period, the one really substantial factor could have been proceeding with 
the major Crossrail project, adding both materially to construction activity and symbolically 
(along with a rash of foreign-financed high rise developments) to confidence in the city’s 
continuing growth. But additionally, the pattern of growth in head offices, alongside cost-
cutting in branch establishments, and the particular resilience of central London’s 
health/education activities, imply strategic shifts with significant positive impacts on this core 
area of the metropolis. 
The ‘elephant in the room’, however, is monetary policy – both in the sense of the vastness of 
the monetary resources that have been deployed, and in relation to (the ‘blind men’s’) 
uncertainty, indeed puzzlement, as to quite what its ‘unconventional’ elements actually 
represent in relation to processes in the ‘real economy’, including activity levels in and 
around the central London financial institutions which are in its front line. If not simply 
passed over to shareholders or rent-earning senior employees, large subsidies to the investing 
arms of banks must, however, surely add substantial employment to their home bases.  And 
similarly, large injections of liquidity which go into high risk opportunities abroad must 
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surely have their main UK impacts in the places that handle/enable these transactions – and 
can satisfy the sophisticated tastes of their stakeholders.  
Employment trends in central London since the onset of the financial crisis in late 2007 can 
be read in two ways, as reflecting either the onset of some new, durable boost to the city’s 
competitive advantage, at just the point when one of its weaknesses had been exposed, or two 
shorter term factors, one effectively damping down the local impact of a major economic 
bust, and the other adding fuel to the firing up of another London-centred boom. In truth, 
more than one or two factors seem to have been in play, but of those noted in this paper the 
only two which seem to fit the first characterisation are those of the depreciation-assisted 
upsurge in international tourism (though the exchange rate boost must have almost run its 
course) and the suggestion of a stronger centripetal tendency in corporate decision-making 
and the quasi-markets of public service development. Rather more persuasive is the idea that 
there are different stories to tell about the downswing and the upswing, though with financial 
support policies apparently playing strong, if currently unquantifiable roles in each – massive 
subsidies to the city’s major investment banks (surely) absorbing much of the momentum of 
the expected downswing, while two underplayed aspects of QE, its diversion into emerging 
markets and revival of plutonomic consumption (also surely) gave a kick-start to an 
especially strong upswing for this city.   
To return to my theme, the speculatively volatile character of the London economy is in 
many ways productive, reflecting the interacting dynamics of pioneering activities in a highly 
interactive agglomeration – though there is also a rather less productive aspect to it focused 
on shifting valuations of existing assets in short supply within the city.  In the case of the 
boom which is underway, the speculative aspect seems almost entirely to do with the values 
of overseas assets and the lifestyles these can support, rather than with any internal dynamic 
within the city’s own productive economy.     
23 
Table 1 
Employment Trends Before and After the Crisis: Central London compared with Other 
Areas, with two different data sources 
FTE Change 2007-13 Difference in % 
growth p.a, 
compared with 
2004-7 
000s % 
APS (all employed) 
5 Central London 
Boroughs 
+259 20.1% +1.5% 
Rest of London +18 0.8% -1.0% 
Rest of Great 
Britain 
-347 -1.7% -1.1% 
Great Britain -70 -0.3% -0.9% 
ABI/BRES 
(employees) 
5 Central London 
Boroughs 
+209 14.7% -0.6% 
Rest of London +40 1.9% +0.4% 
Rest of Great 
Britain 
-551 -2.9% -1.4% 
Great Britain -289 -1.3% -1.1% 
Sources: Office of National Statistics’ Labour Force Survey (worker-based) and Annual Business 
Inquiry/Business Register and Employment Survey (employer-based) data, obtained via NOMIS. 
Notes:  1. The APS estimates relate to all employed persons (aged 16-64), whereas the ABI/BRES data relate 
only to employees (of all ages); 2. APS data are averaged from surveys conducted throughout the calendar 
year referred to, whereas ABI/BRES employment figures (notionally) relate to September only; 3. For both 
surveys the cited employment figures relate to places of work, including the City, Camden, Hackney, Tower 
Hamlets and Westminster as the central boroughs; 4. The APS is the recommended ONS source for numbers of 
people in employment, and the ABI/BRES for finer industrial/spatial breakdowns.   
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Figure 1a 
Annual Employment Changes 2004-14: Central London versus the Rest of the UK 
LFS data 
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Employment by Workplace. 
Notes: 1. Data relate to Full Time Equivalents (one part-timer = 50% of full-timer) and include the self-
employed;  2. Reported figures represent averages for 4 successive quarters; charted changes relate to the 
diffeence between one 12 month period and that a year previously; dates refer to the end of one period and 
the start of another (e.g. the change between calendar 2004 and calendar 2005 is shown at 2005.0).  3. Central 
London in this graph relates to the City of London plus 4 neighbouring boroughs.   
Figure 1b 
Annual Employment Changes 2003-14: Central London versus the Rest of GB 
ABI/BRES data 
Source: Annual Business Inquiry and Business Register and Employment Survey (spliced together) 
Notes: 1. Data relate to FTEs (as in Fig. 1a); 2 Annual survey returns relate nominally to September each year; 
changes shown are relative to the preceding year; dates in the chart refer to the calendar year of the second 
return.; 3 Central London in this graph relates to the 54 wards of our Central London zone (see map in 
Appendix).  
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